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Abstract
This study investigates the equilibrium and welfare properties of free entry under common
ownership. We formulate a model in which incumbents under common ownership choose whether
to enter a new market. We find that an increase in common ownership reduces entries, which
may or may not improve welfare. Welfare has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the degree
of common ownership. However, if firms do not have common ownership before the entry, after
entry common ownership harms welfare.
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1 Introduction
In practice the same set of institutional investors often own many listed firms ((Azar et al., 2019).
Partial ownership by common owners in the same industries may internalize industry-wide exter-
nalities and improve welfare.1 However, common ownership reduces firms’ incentives to compete
in product markets and may be harmful for welfare (Azar et al., 2019). Common ownership has
become a central issue in recent debates on antitrust policies because the degree of common own-
ership grew substantially in recent years, and some empirical studies show that it has a substantial
effect on the strategic behavior of firms held by institutional shareholders.2
In some markets, common ownership also affects firms’ entry decisions. For example, Newham
et al. (2018) show that an increase in common ownership decreases the likelihood of the entry
of generic medications in pharmaceutical markets. However, the body of theoretical literature on
welfare and the policy implications of common ownership in free-entry markets is quite small.
In this note, we consider the welfare impact of common ownership in free entry markets. To
consider the welfare impacts of common ownership, we must first understand whether the presence
of common ownership mitigates or exacerbates excessive entry in free entry markets (Mankiw and
Whinston, 1986). Common ownership tends to make firms less aggressive and thus increases firms’
profits, which increases incentives for entry. Common ownership may, however, make firms inter-
nalize the business-stealing effects at the time of entry, which then reduces the incentives for entry.
When the latter dominates the former, the presence of common ownership may mitigate excessive
entry and thus improve welfare. We formulate a model in which incumbent firms under common
ownership choose whether they enter a new market. Using a circular-city model of Salop (1979),
we investigate how the degree of common ownership affects the equilibrium and welfare properties
in free entry markets. We find that an increase in common ownership reduces entries, which may
or may not improve welfare. This means that both excessive and insufficient entries can emerge.
Moreover, we find an inverted-U shape relationship between the degree of common ownership and
welfare.
However, if no common ownership exists before the entry, and firms are under common ownership
only after the entry, an increase of common ownership increases entry, which is harmful for welfare,
because the number of entering firms is always excessive in this case.
1Lo´pez and Vives (2019) point out that common ownership internalizes a spillover effect of R&D and may accelerate
welfare-improving R&D.
2See Backus et al. (2019) for an example of a rise in common ownership in the US, and Schmalz (2018) for a review
of empirical studies that suggests links between common ownership and firms’ behaviors. For antitrust concerns, see
Elhauge (2016).
2
2 Model
There are N ∈ N potential entrants in a market. Among the potential entrants, n firms enter
another market and compete in prices.3 Following the recent theoretical literature on common
ownership (e.g., Lo´pez and Vives, 2019), we assume that each firm i has the following post-entry
objective function
ψi = pii(p) + λ
∑
j 6=i
pij(p), (1)
where
pii(p) := di(p)(pi − c)− F (2)
is the product-market profit of firm i given a price profile p := (pj)j=1,...,N , c is the constant marginal
cost of production, F is the entry cost, and λ is the degree of common ownership. To focus on the
partial ownership by common investors, we assume λ < 1/2.
Assuming a symmetric demand system and symmetric equilibrium in a product market, we ob-
tain the equilibrium price pS(n, λ) and profit piS(n, λ) as functions of n and λ, where the superscript
S denotes the short-run equilibrium (given the number of firms). We assume that piS is decreasing
in n.
Each firm enters the market whenever ψi increases as a result of its entry. Then, the number of
firms in free-entry equilibrium is given by
ψE(n, λ) = ψO(n− 1, λ), (3)
where
ψE(n, λ) := piS(n, λ) + λ(n− 1)piS(n, λ) (4)
and
ψO(n, λ) := λnpiS(n, λ) (5)
are the value of objective functions when a firm enters the market and when it does not. Let n∗(λ)
be the solution to equation (3). By arranging equation (3), we have
piS(n∗, λ) = λ(n∗ − 1)
{
piS(n∗ − 1, λ)− piS(n∗, λ)
}
. (6)
Assuming n∗ > 1, we obtain piS(n∗, λ) > 0.
3The model describes the following situation. There are incumbents under common ownership. A new market
emerges and incumbents are potential new entrants in this new market. For example, pharmaceutical companies
under common ownership consider whether to enter a new immune checkpoint drug market with R&D expenditure.
Another example is the Japanese gas market. This market was liberalized in 2016, and thereafter, electric and oil
companies under common ownership entered the new market.
3
3 Circular Market
In this section, we present the welfare analysis of the equilibrium number of firms using a circular-
city model of Salop (1979). Consumers are located uniformly on a circle with a perimeter equal
to 1 and density is unitary around the circle. Firms are located around the circle. Consumers
buy one unit of the good at the lowest cost (the price of the product + the transportation cost).
Transport cost is proportional to the distance and the unit transport cost is t > 0. We assume that
the willingness to pay for the product is so high that all consumers buy the products.
First, we consider the price competition stage. Suppose that firm i chooses price pi and all other
firms choose pS . Each firm has only two real competitors, namely the two on either side of it.4 A
consumer located at the distance of x ∈ (0, 1/n) from firm i is indifferent about purchasing from
firm i or purchasing from its closest neighbor if pi + tx = p
S + t(1/n − x). Each firm i faces a
demand of
di(pi, p
S) = 2x =
1
n
−
pi − p
S
t
.
Firm i maximizes (pi − c)di + 2λ(p
S
− c)(1/n− di/2). Note that firm i’s pricing affects only the
two neighboring firms’ profits. The first-order condition is
di −
pi − c
t
+ λ
pS − c
t
= 0.
Substituting pi = p
S , we obtain
pS(n, λ) = c+
t
n(1− λ)
.
Given the number of firms n, the equilibrium profit is
piS(n, λ) = (pS(n, λ)− c)di(p
S(n, λ), pS(n, λ))− F =
1
n2
t
1− λ
− F.
We obtain the number of firms that maximizes welfare by minimizing of the following sum of
transport and entry costs:
K(n) := 2n
∫ 1/2n
0
txdx+ nF =
t
4n
+ nF,
4If n = 2, the the firm competes with the same rival at each side, and the following analysis applies to this case
as well. However, the following analysis does not apply when n = 1 because the monopolist has no competitor and
ontains profit greater than piS(1).
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Figure 1: The stable equilibrium
which leads to the socially optimal number of firms
nO =
1
2
√
t
F
.
We assume that
√
t/F/2 > 1 so that nO > 1.
By arranging the free-entry condition (3), we obtain the following condition:5
G(n, λ, t, F ) :=
t
1− λ
1
n2
{
1− λ
2n− 1
n− 1
}
− F = 0.
or equivalently
H(n, λ, F/t) := n− 1− λ(2n− 1)−
(1− λ)F
t
n2(n− 1) = 0.
H is a cubic function of n and the equation H = 0 has at most three solutions. Figure 1 illustrates
the shape of H(n, λ, F/t).6
5H > (=, <) 0 if ψE(n, λ) > (=, <) ψO(n, λ).
6We set λ = 0.3, F = 0.05, and t = 3.
5
One of three possible solutions is negative, and thus it is not equilibrium. Two are positive
whenever they exist and the largest solution is the unique stable equilibrium. The positive solutions
exist and the greater solution exceeds one unless F/t is too large.7 We denote the unique stable
equilibrium number of firms as n∗(λ, F/t).8 We denote the unique stable equilibrium number of
firms as n∗(λ, F/t).
Calculations show that ∂H/∂λ < 0 and ∂H/∂(F/t) > 0 at n = n∗(λ, F/t). These results implies
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 n∗(λ, F/t) decreases with λ and F/t.
Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 is consistent with Newham et al.’s (2018) findings that the presence of common
ownership reduce the incentive for entry in pharmaceutical markets. Common ownership internalizes
the business-stealing effects at the entry stage, which reduces the incentives for entry.
Evaluating G(n, λ) at n = nO, we can check whether n∗ > nO (excess entry) or n∗ < nO
(insufficient entry); the latter holds if and only if
Γ(nO, λ) := G(nO, λ) =
F
1− λ
{
3− λ
7nO − 3
nO − 1
}
< 0,
where we use nO =
√
t/F/2.
Figure 2 illustrates the range for excess and insufficient entries.9
Because ∂Γ/∂nO > 0 and ∂Γ/∂λ < 0, we obtain that Γ(nO, λ) < 0 more likely holds when nO
7The local maximum of H is given by the first-order condition
3n2 − 2n−
t
(1− λ)F
(1− 2λ) = 0.
Thus, the local maximum of H is attained at
nˆ(λ, t, F ) =
1 +
√
1 + 3 t
(1−λ)F
(1− 2λ)
3
.
Because λ < 1/2, we find that nˆ is decreasing in F/t, and F/t→ 0, then nˆ→∞. Therefore, there exists βˆ such that
nˆ > 1 if and only if F/t < βˆ.
By the envelope theorem, we have
dH(nˆ(λ, F/t), λ, F/t)
d(F/t)
= −(1− λ)nˆ2(nˆ− 1) < 0,
as long as nˆ > 1. F/t→ 0, then nˆ→∞ and nˆ→∞, then dH/d(F/t)→ −∞. Therefore, together with the fact that
H(1, λ) < 0, there exists αˆ < βˆ such that nˆ > 1 and H(nˆ, λ, F/t) > 0 for F/t < αˆ. Finally, if H(nˆ, λ, F/t) > 0, there
are two positive solutions to H(n, λ) = 0. In summary, n∗ > 1 exists if F/t is not too large.
8If H(n, λ, F/t) has no positive solution, then the equilibrium number of the firms is one (if the monopolist obtains
positive profits) or zero (even the monopolist cannot obtain positive profits). If λ ≥ 1/2, then H(n, λ, F/t) has no
positive solution, and thus, either the monopoly or no entry emerges in equilibrium.
9We set t/F = 1, 000.
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7
is smaller and λ is greater. Thus, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (i) The equilibrium welfare decreases with λ if and only if n∗(λ, F/t) < nO (entry
is insufficient). (ii) There exists λ¯ ∈ (0, 3/7) such that n∗(λ, F/t) < nO (entry is insufficient) if
and only if λ > λ¯.
Proof See the Appendix.
When λ = 0, the entry is excessive for welfare due to the business-stealing effects (Salop, 1979;
Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). Until λ hits the critical value λ¯, entry is excessive. Because an
increase in common ownership reduces the equilibrium entry, it improves welfare. However, once
λ exceeds λ¯, insufficient entry emerges because the business-stealing effects are internalized, and
further increases in common ownership reduce welfare. Thus, welfare has an inverted-U shape
relationship with the degree of common ownership. Moreover, our result shows that there exists a
strictly positive socially optimal degree of common ownership.
4 The Case Without Common Ownership Before Entry
We now discuss an alternative model in which entrants do not have common ownership before the
entry. In this case, ψO(n, λ) = 0, and thus, the number of firms in free-entry equilibrium is given
by
piS(n, λ) = 0. (7)
Let n∗∗ be the solution to equation (7). Because piS(n∗, λ) > 0 and piS(n∗∗, λ) = 0, we obtain
n∗ < n∗∗.
Using the circular-market model, we obtain the following equilibrium number of firms n∗∗;
n∗∗(λ, F/t) =
√
t
(1− λ)F
>
1
2
√
t
F
= nO. (8)
Thus, for any λ ∈ [0, 1), n∗∗(λ, F/t) is excessive for welfare. Because n∗∗(λ, F/t) is increasing in λ,
common ownership exacerbates the excessive entry. Therefore, an increase in λ is always harmful
for welfare.
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship among nO, n∗, and n∗∗ (in the numerical example, t/F =
2, 000). In general, n∗ = n∗∗ if λ = 0, and n∗ < n∗∗ otherwise. In the circular-market model,
n∗∗ > nO for any λ and n∗ < nO (n∗ > nO) when λ is large (small).
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5 Concluding remarks
In this note, using a circular-market model, we show that whether or not firms have common
ownership before entry is crucial. If firms have common ownership before entry, common ownership
reduces the number of firms. This may or may not improve welfare because the equilibrium number
of firms may or may not be insufficient. Meanwhile, if firms do not have common ownership before
entry, common ownership increases the number of firms, which is harmful for welfare.
In this note we use a standard circular-market model with inelastic demand. Incorporating
elastic demand systems makes the analysis intractable and we failed to obtain clear-cut result.10
This extension would enrich the welfare implications of common ownership in free entry markets
and remains for future research.
10The number of firms can be insufficient even without common ownership if the demand is elastic. See Gu and
Wenzel (2009).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The implicit function theorem implies that
dn∗
dλ
= −
∂G/∂λ
∂G/∂n
∣∣∣∣∣
n=n∗(λ)
, and
dn∗
d(F/t)
= −
∂G/∂(F/t)
∂G/∂n
∣∣∣∣∣
n=n∗(λ)
. (9)
Because
∂G
∂λ
= −
t
(1− λ)2n(n− 1)
< 0,
sign(∂G/∂(F/t)) = sign(∂H/∂(F/t)) < 0, and sign(∂G/∂n) = sign(∂H/∂n) < 0 at n = n∗(λ)
because n∗ is the largest solution to a cubic equation with negative coefficient on n3, we have
dn∗/dλ < 0 and dn∗/d(F/t) < 0. This implies Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2-(i) simply holds due to the concavity of welfare function. Γ(nO, λ) < 0 if and only if
λ >
3(nO − 1)
7nO − 3
=: λ¯.
Let γ(nO) := 3(nO − 1)/(7nO − 3). Because nO =
√
t/F/2 > 1, γ(1) = 0, γ′(nO) > 0, and
limnO→∞ γ(n
O) = 3/7, we obtain λ¯ = γ(nO) ∈ (0, 3/7) for any nO > 1. Q.E.D.
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